Files
ai-app/AGENTS.md
T
irisandClaude Fable 5 65743b899d Generate the TLS certificates in process
gen-dev-cert.sh is gone. The server ensures its own certificates on start,
which removes a setup step to remember, a dependency on whatever openssl
was installed, and a second place for the "which addresses?" answer to
live -- the leaf now covers every local IPv4 plus loopback and the
emulator's host alias, so nobody maintains a hardcoded IP.

The split that mattered in the script is kept and now enforced by tests:
the CA is generated once and left alone, because the app pins it and
replacing it strands every installed copy; the leaf is cheap and reissued
every start, so covering a new address is a restart. Both are written
owner-only into a directory outside the repo.

Two things the tests caught. DirBuilder's mode applies only when the
directory is created, so a directory that already existed kept whatever
permissions it had while holding a private key -- the mode is now set
explicitly, in the session directories too. And loading the leaf into the
real RustlsConfig needs the crypto provider installed, which main does but
tests don't.

Verified end to end: deleted the certs, started the server, watched it
generate a CA and warn that installed apps now pin the wrong one, rebuilt
the APK against the new CA, and reinstalled -- the emulator connects over
a certificate that never existed as a pasted constant.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_017xn8nHw1tw1R6PtiY1eEtw
2026-08-25 04:36:54 -04:00

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# ai-app
A phone interface to AI coding sessions (Claude Code and llama.cpp via pi),
replacing the Claude app for daily use. Rust/Axum backend on the desktop,
Kotlin/Compose Android app, WireGuard + pinned self-signed TLS + bearer token
between them.
**`PLAN.md` is the design source of truth.** Read it before building or
changing anything structural. It records every decision with its date, its
rationale, and the alternatives that were rejected and why — keep that habit
when a decision changes: update the plan in place, don't let this file and
the plan drift into two versions of the truth. This file is the working notes
layer: conventions, commands, and things that have bitten.
The central design point, worth not undoing by accident: **a session is a
child process speaking JSONL over stdio, translated into one common event
model.** Claude Code (stream-json) and pi (RPC mode) are two translators
behind one `Driver` trait; the transcript, the SSE stream, the phone UI, and
SSH spawning (the same command wrapped in `ssh host …`) all work purely in
the common model. A new session type is a new driver — never a
session-type branch in shared code (routes, transcript, app screens).
## Layout
Mirrors `../local-updater` deliberately — same stack (axum 0.8 +
axum-server/rustls, tokio, clap; Kotlin 2.4.x + Compose Multiplatform,
single `:androidApp` module), same cert scheme, same registry pattern (every
session mutation funnels through the manager so in-memory and on-disk state
can't come apart). Read local-updater's `README.md` and `AGENTS.md` for the
conventions before diverging from them; module-by-module intent for this
repo is in PLAN.md's "Backend layout" section.
- `server/` — Rust backend (`ai-server`). `main.rs` bootstraps (TLS, the
auth layer, token/QR enrollment, wg0 binding), `routes.rs` has the HTTP
table in its module doc comment, `auth.rs` the bearer-token middleware,
`config.rs` the persisted schema, `session/` the manager (registry
pattern), `Driver` trait + event model, `EchoDriver`, and transcripts.
- `app/` — Compose Android app, single `:androidApp` module, package
`com.example.aiapp`, label "AI Sessions". `AppRoot.kt` is the navigation
`when`; `Api.kt`/`EventStream.kt` the REST + SSE clients; `Events.kt` the
event model mirror; `ServerConfig.kt` settings + Keystore-sealed token;
screens in `SessionListScreen/SessionScreen/SpawnScreen/SettingsScreen`.
- `server/src/certs.rs` — the TLS certificates, generated in process on
first start into `$XDG_CONFIG_HOME/ai-app/certs`: idempotent CA, leaf
reissued every start covering every local IPv4 plus 127.0.0.1 and
10.0.2.2 (emulator → host). Regenerating the CA strands the installed
app — the one-way door.
## Status
Phases 13 done 2026-08-24 (see PLAN.md's phase list for what each
verified): the skeleton pipe, the full Claude driver (streaming, tools,
permission + AskUserQuestion cards, steering, interrupt, `--resume`
crash recovery, images both ways), and the usage screen. Phase 4
(pi/llama.cpp) is deferred — not testable in this VM. Next: phase 5
(SSH; needs a decision on how to test — no keys in `~/.ssh` here) and
real-phone/WireGuard bring-up, which is operational rather than code.
## Checking your work
- Server: `./run-tests.sh` (or `cargo test`) + `cargo clippy --all-targets`
from `server/` — the build stays warning-clean, keep it that way.
- App: from `app/`, `. ./android-env.sh && ./gradlew :androidApp:compileDebugKotlin`
to typecheck; `./build-apk.sh` to produce the APK to install on a phone
(through Local Updater); `./run-android.sh` to build, install, and launch
on the emulator.
- **The APK pins the CA of the machine that builds it**, read at build time
from `$XDG_CONFIG_HOME/ai-app/certs/ca.pem` (`AI_APP_CA` overrides) and
generated into a constant. So the server must have started once on that
machine first — the build stops with that instruction otherwise — and an
APK built in this VM only works against a server in this VM.
- Run the server for development with `--bind 127.0.0.1` (wg0 doesn't exist
on this machine yet; the default fails closed). First run prints the
enrollment QR/URI with the token — capture it from the log.
- Prefer exercising the server directly over going through the UI:
`curl --cacert certs/ca.pem -H "Authorization: Bearer …" https://127.0.0.1:8443/sessions`.
The emulator app reaches it at `https://10.0.2.2:8443`; enroll it with
`adb shell "am start -a android.intent.action.VIEW -d 'aiapp://enroll?host=10.0.2.2&port=8443&token=…'"`
(quote so the device shell doesn't eat the `&`s).
## Where things run (host vs this VM)
Established 2026-08-25, and it decides more than it looks like:
- **The host (192.168.1.168) is the backend machine.** It runs
local-updater's server today and is where `ai-server` belongs in
production: it has the LAN address the phone can reach, and it's where
WireGuard terminates. `wg-setup-host.sh` sets that up (keys, `wg0.conf`,
the phone's QR); run it there with `sudo WG_ENDPOINT=<ddns name>`.
- **This VM is a dev sandbox behind qemu user-mode networking**
(10.0.2.15, gateway 10.0.2.2) — outbound only. The host is reachable at
10.0.2.2, but **nothing outside can initiate a connection into the VM**,
so the tunnel and the real phone can never terminate here.
- **Code reaches the host through gitea, not the shared mount.** This VM's
checkout (`~/host/repos/ai-app`, a virtiofs mount the host also sees at
`~/stuff/vm/ai/repos/ai-app`) is a working copy only: its `origin` is
`git@git.arirex.me:iris/ai-app`, and the VM's key is **not** authorized
for it — pushing from here fails with `Permission denied (publickey)`.
The host pushes, and its own separate clone — outside the shared mount —
is what gets built and run. So the review at push time, not a filesystem
permission, is what keeps VM-authored code off the host.
- Consequence for building here: `server/target/` is shared with the host's
view of *this* checkout, so if anything on the host ever builds from the
shared path, the two `cargo build`s replace each other's binary and each
rebuilds from scratch. Building on the host from its own clone avoids it
entirely.
- `wg0` (10.66.0.1) now exists in this VM too, so the production path —
`ai-server` with no `--bind` — is exercisable during development. It has
no reachable peer and doesn't need one; the interface existing is what
the server requires. Consequence: **with no `--bind`, the emulator can't
reach the server** (it dials 10.0.2.2), so keep using
`--bind 127.0.0.1` for app work.
- `./test-wg-tunnel.sh up|test|down` builds a real tunnel between two
network namespaces inside one machine and drives the server through it
— a genuine handshake against 10.66.0.1 with pinned TLS, no router or
phone involved. That's the way to verify the wg0-only posture.
- **The `claude` CLI is installed in this VM only, not on the host.** So
the backend reaches it the same way it would any other machine: a
configured host, and a session that names it. For the host to ssh in,
the VM needs an inbound port forward in its launch configuration
(qemu `hostfwd`) — usermode networking has none by default.
- **Nothing secret goes in the repo.** The VM is treated as untrusted (see
PLAN.md's security section), and the repo is shared read-write with the
host, so state lives outside it: `$XDG_CONFIG_HOME/ai-app/config.json`
and `certs/`, `$XDG_DATA_HOME/ai-app/sessions/`, owner-only.
- Certificates are generated **by the server, on first start**, into
`$XDG_CONFIG_HOME/ai-app/certs` (`--certs` overrides). The CA is created
once and then left alone; the leaf is reissued every start, so covering a
new address is a restart. Starting the server in the VM therefore makes a
separate throwaway dev CA for emulator work — never install a build
pinning that on the real phone.
- Point development at a scratch state directory rather than the real one:
`--config /tmp/…/config.json --data-dir /tmp/…/sessions --port 8444`, or
`XDG_CONFIG_HOME=… XDG_DATA_HOME=…`.
## Things that have bitten
- **tracing caches callsite interest process-wide.** A test that hits a
`tracing::warn!` with no subscriber installed can poison the interest
cache for a concurrent test that captures logs (flaky "nothing was
logged" failures). Keep every exercise of a logging code path under the
one capturing subscriber — that's why the auth middleware has a single
combined gating+logging test.
- **The keyboard pans the window unless the activity opts into resize.**
Without `android:windowSoftInputMode="adjustResize"`, opening the IME
slides the whole window up (top bar off screen) instead of resizing —
`imePadding()` alone doesn't fix it and the transcript looks empty.
- **CMP 1.11 deprecates the `compose.*` dependency accessors** — declare
`org.jetbrains.compose.<x>:<x>` directly (material3 has its own release
train, separate from the CMP version).
- **A PEM constant must start at the opening quotes.** A generated
`"""\n-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----` costs Android's `CertificateFactory`
its preamble sniff, so it tries DER instead and fails at runtime with
`ASN.1 ... DECODE_ERROR` — nowhere near the code that produced it.
- **AGP 9 refuses `Provider`s in the source-set API**: generated sources go
through `androidComponents.onVariants { it.sources.java?.addGenerated
SourceDirectory(task, Task::outputDir) }`, which also carries the task
dependency.
## Environment notes (this machine, learned in local-updater)
- Android SDK is at `~/Android/Sdk`, not the root-owned `/opt/android-sdk`
the ambient `$ANDROID_HOME` may point at; copy local-updater's
`android-env.sh` override pattern.
- Each agent command runs in a fresh shell — exported environment does not
carry over. Chain: `cd app && . ./android-env.sh && ./gradlew …`. Never
pipe `source` into `head`/`grep` (subshell discards the exports).
- The shared emulator AVD is named `tdep` — one emulator across the Android
projects on this machine, not one per repo.
- Long-running servers launched from an agent must be fully detached
(`setsid nohup … & disown -h`, verify `PPID 1`), and every
`pgrep -f`/`pkill -f` pattern needs its first character bracketed
(`[a]i-server`) in **every** occurrence in the command, or the pattern
matches the shell running it. Full explanation in local-updater's
`AGENTS.md` — it bites exactly the same way here.