//! The TLS certificates a server presents, generated in process on first
//! start, from a CA the app pins.
//!
//! Shared because it existed twice and differed by an organisation name.
//! It is also the piece where being written twice is worst: a trust
//! anchor built two ways can be built differently two ways, and the
//! difference would surface as an opaque handshake failure on a phone.
//!
//! `product` names the certificate's organisation and common name, and is
//! the whole of what is per-project.
//!
//! There used to be a `gen-dev-cert.sh` calling openssl, which meant a
//! setup step to remember, a second place for the "which SANs?" answer to
//! live, and a dependency on whatever openssl was installed. Doing it here
//! means the server can simply ensure its own certificates exist, with the
//! file modes and extensions it wants, and with the address it is actually
//! about to bind already in the leaf.
//!
//! The split that matters is between the two:
//!
//! - The **CA** is generated once and then left alone. The updater app
//!   pins it, so replacing it strands every installed copy -- recovery is
//!   a reinstall over the plain-HTTP bootstrap port. It is the one thing
//!   here that is a one-way door.
//! - The **leaf** is cheap and reissued on every start, signed by that
//!   same unchanged CA. Nothing pins it, so covering a new address is just
//!   a restart rather than anything the phone has to be told about.
//!
//! Everything is written owner-only into a directory outside the repo (see
//! `config_home`): a CA private key readable by another machine is one it
//! can sign with, and a certificate signed by a pinned CA is accepted
//! without question.

use std::net::IpAddr;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};

use anyhow::{Context, Result};
use rcgen::{
    BasicConstraints, CertificateParams, DnType, IsCa, Issuer, KeyPair, KeyUsagePurpose, SanType,
};

/// Where the leaf lives, for handing to the TLS listener.
pub struct Certificates {
    pub leaf_cert: PathBuf,
    pub leaf_key: PathBuf,
    /// True when the CA was created just now, i.e. anything already
    /// installed pins the wrong one and has to be reinstalled.
    pub ca_is_new: bool,
}

/// Ensures `dir` holds a CA and a leaf covering `addresses`, creating what
/// is missing. Safe to call on every start.
pub fn ensure(product: &str, dir: &Path, addresses: &[IpAddr]) -> Result<Certificates> {
    crate::private::create_dir(dir)?;

    let ca_cert_path = dir.join("ca.pem");
    let ca_key_path = dir.join("ca-key.pem");
    let ca_is_new = !ca_cert_path.is_file() || !ca_key_path.is_file();

    let (ca_pem, ca_key_pem) = if ca_is_new {
        let (pem, key) = generate_ca(product)?;
        crate::private::write_file(&ca_key_path, key.as_bytes())?;
        crate::private::write_file(&ca_cert_path, pem.as_bytes())?;
        tracing::info!("generated a new CA in {}", dir.display());
        (pem, key)
    } else {
        (
            std::fs::read_to_string(&ca_cert_path)
                .with_context(|| format!("read {}", ca_cert_path.display()))?,
            std::fs::read_to_string(&ca_key_path)
                .with_context(|| format!("read {}", ca_key_path.display()))?,
        )
    };

    let (leaf_pem, leaf_key_pem) = generate_leaf(product, &ca_pem, &ca_key_pem, addresses)?;
    let leaf_cert = dir.join("leaf.pem");
    let leaf_key = dir.join("leaf-key.pem");
    crate::private::write_file(&leaf_key, leaf_key_pem.as_bytes())?;
    crate::private::write_file(&leaf_cert, leaf_pem.as_bytes())?;

    Ok(Certificates {
        leaf_cert,
        leaf_key,
        ca_is_new,
    })
}

fn generate_ca(product: &str) -> Result<(String, String)> {
    let key = KeyPair::generate().context("generate CA key")?;
    let mut params = CertificateParams::default();
    params
        .distinguished_name
        .push(DnType::OrganizationName, format!("{product} dev"));
    params
        .distinguished_name
        .push(DnType::CommonName, format!("{product} dev CA"));
    params.is_ca = IsCa::Ca(BasicConstraints::Unconstrained);
    // Explicit, because strict verifiers reject a CA without them -- and
    // that rejection surfaces as an opaque handshake failure on a phone.
    params.key_usages = vec![KeyUsagePurpose::KeyCertSign, KeyUsagePurpose::CrlSign];
    let certificate = params.self_signed(&key).context("self-sign CA")?;
    Ok((certificate.pem(), key.serialize_pem()))
}

fn generate_leaf(
    product: &str,
    ca_pem: &str,
    ca_key_pem: &str,
    addresses: &[IpAddr],
) -> Result<(String, String)> {
    let ca_key = KeyPair::from_pem(ca_key_pem).context("read CA key")?;
    let issuer = Issuer::from_ca_cert_pem(ca_pem, ca_key).context("read CA certificate")?;

    let key = KeyPair::generate().context("generate leaf key")?;
    let mut params = CertificateParams::default();
    params
        .distinguished_name
        .push(DnType::OrganizationName, format!("{product} dev"));
    params.distinguished_name.push(
        DnType::CommonName,
        addresses
            .first()
            .map(|a| a.to_string())
            .unwrap_or_else(|| product.to_string()),
    );
    params.subject_alt_names = addresses.iter().map(|a| SanType::IpAddress(*a)).collect();
    params.is_ca = IsCa::ExplicitNoCa;
    params.key_usages = vec![KeyUsagePurpose::DigitalSignature];
    params.use_authority_key_identifier_extension = true;
    let certificate = params.signed_by(&key, &issuer).context("sign leaf")?;
    Ok((certificate.pem(), key.serialize_pem()))
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;

    use super::*;

    fn decode_pem(pem: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
        use base64::Engine;
        let body: String = pem
            .lines()
            .filter(|line| !line.starts_with("-----"))
            .collect();
        base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD
            .decode(body)
            .expect("base64")
    }

    fn contains(haystack: &[u8], needle: &[u8]) -> bool {
        haystack
            .windows(needle.len())
            .any(|window| window == needle)
    }

    fn addresses() -> Vec<IpAddr> {
        vec!["192.168.1.5".parse().unwrap(), "127.0.0.1".parse().unwrap()]
    }

    #[test]
    fn generates_once_then_keeps_the_ca_and_reissues_the_leaf() {
        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");

        let first = ensure("demo", dir.path(), &addresses()).expect("generate");
        assert!(first.ca_is_new);
        let ca = std::fs::read_to_string(dir.path().join("ca.pem")).expect("ca");
        let leaf = std::fs::read_to_string(&first.leaf_cert).expect("leaf");
        assert!(ca.starts_with("-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----"));

        let second = ensure("demo", dir.path(), &addresses()).expect("regenerate");
        // The CA is the pinned one: replacing it strands every installed
        // app, so it must survive a restart untouched.
        assert!(!second.ca_is_new);
        assert_eq!(
            ca,
            std::fs::read_to_string(dir.path().join("ca.pem")).expect("ca")
        );
        // The leaf is not pinned, and is reissued so a new address is a
        // restart away rather than a reinstall.
        assert_ne!(
            leaf,
            std::fs::read_to_string(&second.leaf_cert).expect("leaf")
        );
    }

    /// Private keys are rewritten on every start, which is the case that
    /// makes the mode matter: `private` narrows a file that already
    /// exists, and this is the caller that depends on it.
    #[test]
    fn everything_is_owner_only_even_on_the_second_start() {
        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
        ensure("demo", dir.path(), &addresses()).expect("generate");

        // What an older version could have left behind.
        for file in ["leaf.pem", "leaf-key.pem"] {
            std::fs::set_permissions(
                dir.path().join(file),
                std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o644),
            )
            .expect("chmod");
        }
        ensure("demo", dir.path(), &addresses()).expect("reissue");

        let mode = |path: std::path::PathBuf| {
            std::fs::metadata(&path).expect("stat").permissions().mode() & 0o777
        };
        assert_eq!(mode(dir.path().to_path_buf()), 0o700);
        for file in ["ca.pem", "ca-key.pem", "leaf.pem", "leaf-key.pem"] {
            assert_eq!(
                mode(dir.path().join(file)),
                0o600,
                "{file} is not owner-only"
            );
        }
    }

    /// The product name is the whole of what is per-project, so it has to
    /// reach the certificate rather than being decoration.
    #[test]
    fn the_product_names_the_certificate() {
        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().expect("tempdir");
        ensure("dev-updater", dir.path(), &addresses()).expect("generate");
        let ca = std::fs::read_to_string(dir.path().join("ca.pem")).expect("ca");

        // Decoded rather than searched as base64: a distinguished name is
        // stored in the DER as literal bytes, so this checks the value
        // that actually reaches a phone rather than the value we passed in.
        let der = decode_pem(&ca);
        assert!(
            contains(&der, b"dev-updater dev CA"),
            "the CA's common name"
        );
        assert!(contains(&der, b"dev-updater dev"), "the organisation");
    }
}